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PILOTS OUT OF UNIFORM: HOW THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S
ETIHAD DECISION UNDERMINES THE PURPOSE OF
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
J. COLLIN SPRING*

I

N DOE V. ETIHAD AIRWAYS, P.J.S.C., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rewrote the test for mental
anguish under the Montreal Convention to allow recovery with
any physical injury, disregarding years of precedent establishing
a universal interpretation that mental anguish must “flow from”
a physical injury to be recoverable.1 Although the Sixth Circuit
properly found that, on the facts of the case before it, the plaintiff could state a claim for mental anguish, the court unnecessarily rewrote an established test.2 In doing so, the court violated
the presumption in favor of uniformity, impermissibly disregarded the interpretation of the United States’ co-signatory nations, and failed to account for the very purpose of the Montreal
Convention—to bring the law of various nations into uniformity.3 Although the Supreme Court has already declined to grant
certiorari,4 it should take the next possible opportunity to clarify
the law and hold that the traditional interpretation is correct.
Doe was a passenger on an Etihad Airways flight from Abu
Dhabi to Chicago.5 She pricked her finger on a stray hypodermic needle located in the seatback pocket, drawing blood.6 She
filed suit against Etihad under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, claiming physical injury for the pricked finger and
* SMU Dedman School of Law, Candidate for Juris Doctor (May 2020). With
thanks to his parents, Blair and Mary, for their support.
1 Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 417–20 (6th Cir. 2017).
2 Id. at 409.
3 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, pmbl., May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
4 Etihad, 870 F.3d 406, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1548 (2018) (mem.).
5 Id. at 408–09.
6 Id. at 409.
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mental anguish for fear of contracting a disease.7 The trial court
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Etihad, applying
the traditional interpretation of Article 17.8 The Sixth Circuit
reversed on appeal, reinterpreting Article 17 and creating a new
standard for liability.9
The traditional interpretation of Article 17(1) holds that a
plaintiff can recover for mental anguish if the mental injury
“flows from” a physical injury suffered during an onboard accident.10 Notably, there is no requirement of proportionality; even
a slight physical injury can allow for the recovery of mental
anguish damages.11 For example, one court found that a physical injury existed when post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
caused by an emergency landing caused chemical restructuring
of the cells in a plaintiff’s brain.12 In other words, the traditional
interpretation requires a causal relationship but does not specify
a proportional relationship.13 The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation,
conversely, does not require a causal relationship between the
physical and mental injury.14 Rather, the physical injury becomes a threshold test that permits recovery of damages for any
mental anguish resulting from the same accident.15
The Etihad opinion began by noting that Article 17(1) of the
Montreal Convention provided Doe’s sole avenue for relief and
by ceding that cases interpreting the Montreal Convention’s
predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, have persuasive value in
interpreting the new treaty.16 It noted that Warsaw Convention
jurisprudence should control on issues that the drafters of the
Montreal Convention intended to leave unchanged.17 The court
then briefly discussed the Second Circuit’s holding in Ehrlich v.
American Airlines, Inc.,18 a case interpreting the Warsaw ConvenId. at 410–11.
Id.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 376, 378 (2d Cir. 2004).
11 See Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1192 (D. Mont. 1999),
vacated, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002).
12 Id. at 1191–92. But see Lloyd v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 291 F.3d 503, 512 (8th Cir.
2002) (holding that “physical manifestations of earlier emotional injury are not
compensable”).
13 See Lloyd, 291 F.3d at 512.
14 Etihad, 870 F.3d at 427.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 411.
17 See id. at 419.
18 360 F.3d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 2004).
7
8
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tion, which followed the traditional interpretation.19 The court’s
error, however, was deciding that the Warsaw Convention jurisprudence as pertains to mental anguish under Article 17(1) is
unpersuasive and applying a plain-meaning analysis to the text.20
Specifically, the court looked to the phrase “[t]he carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of . . . bodily injury [of a passenger]” and found that the words “in case of” did not imply a
causation requirement for mental anguish.21 The court reached
this conclusion by looking to the dictionary definitions applicable to “in case of.”22 The court gave no clear reason for its position that the drafters of the Montreal Convention intended to
displace the Warsaw Convention’s version of Article 17.
Instead, the court relied on its characterization of the Montreal Convention as a passenger-minded treaty in arriving at this
conclusion, making little effort to analyze the actual history of
the Convention itself.23 The court stated that the purpose of the
Montreal Convention was to shift the balance of power to favor
passengers.24 In support of this proposition, it briefly touched
on some legitimate purposes of the Convention, such as bringing uniformity in the law and adapting the Convention to accommodate the established and mature airline industry.25
Notably, however, the primary authority supporting this characterization of the Montreal Convention as a treaty meant to favor
passengers is a case which in turn cites to Ehrlich—the very case
that the court so painstakingly discredited.26
The Sixth Circuit then analyzed the other circuit court decisions interpreting the Montreal Convention.27 It noted that the
two circuit cases that had considered Article 17(1), Bassam v.
American Airlines, Inc. and Jacob v. Korean Air Lines Co., both cited
the traditional interpretation.28 In Bassam, the Fifth Circuit
stated that “emotional injuries are not recoverable under Article
Etihad, 870 F.3d at 414–17.
Id. at 413–14.
21 See id. at 414, 427 (first alteration in original).
22 Id. at 413.
23 Id. at 420–23.
24 Id. at 423.
25 Id.
26 Id. (citing In re Air Crash at Lexington, 501 F. Supp. 2d 902, 908 (E.D. Ky.
2007)).
27 Id. at 430–31.
28 Id.
19
20
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17 . . . unless they were caused by physical injuries.”29 In Jacob,
the Eleventh Circuit similarly held that “at best, ‘mental injuries
are recoverable under Article 17[(1)] only to the extent that
they have been caused by bodily injuries.’”30 The court then distinguished these cases from Etihad on grounds wholly unrelated
to the interpretation regarding mental anguish and disregarded
their persuasive authority.31
Finally, the court turned its attention to the interpretations of
Article 17 that developed in the other nations party to the Montreal Convention.32 The court turned its attention to the Canadian interpretation, which comports squarely with the
traditional interpretation.33 In Wettlaufer v. Air Transat A.T. Inc.,
a Canadian court denied recovery of certain mental anguish
damages under the Montreal Convention specifically because
there was no “sufficient causal link” between the physical and
mental injury.34 The Sixth Circuit, incredibly, found that the
Wettlaufer interpretation was “entirely consistent with the relief
Doe seeks here and [the Sixth Circuit’s] interpretation of Article 17(1).”35 The court accomplished this feat of mental gymnastics by rewriting the opinion of the Canadian court, finding that,
despite an explicit holding to the contrary, the Canadian court
actually found that the mental injuries were caused by the accident and not the physical injury.36
This opinion presents several problems. First, it mischaracterizes the purpose of the Montreal Convention, disregarding altogether any scrap of the treaty’s history that proved inconvenient
to its ends. Second, it impermissibly violates the presumption in
favor of uniformity and creates a circuit split by deviating from
the traditional interpretation, which other circuits have adhered
to. Finally, and most alarmingly, the decision totally disregards
the interpretations of the United States’ co-signatory nations,
29 Bassam v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 287 F. App’x 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
30 Jacob v. Korean Air Lines Co., 606 F. App’x 478, 482 (11th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (quoting Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 400 (2d Cir. 2004)).
31 The court distinguished Jacob on the grounds that there was no accident and
Bassam on the grounds that there was no physical injury. Etihad, 870 F.3d at
430–31.
32 Id. at 432–33.
33 See id.
34 Wettlaufer v. Air Transat A.T. Inc., 2013 BCSC 1245, para. 88 (Can. B.C.).
35 Etihad, 870 F.3d at 433.
36 Id.; but see Wettlaufer, 2013 BCSC 1245, para. 88.
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which—given that the Sixth Circuit was interpreting a treaty—
should have been given considerable weight.37
The Etihad court’s holding stems from the belief that the
Montreal Convention is a pro-passenger treaty.38 The history
and debate surrounding the treaty clearly show that this is not
the case.39 Rather, the minutes from the meetings during which
the Convention was drafted make evident that the two purposes
of the Convention (vis-à-vis Article 17) were to balance the interests of airlines and passengers and to provide uniformity in the
law.40 Delegates of several nations echoed the sentiment expressed by the Delegate of Spain, that: “[a]ir law [is] a universal
law and must be uniform.”41 The drafters also expressed that the
purpose of the Montreal Convention was to “tak[e] into account
the interests of all, be they . . . passengers or carriers.”42
Clearly, then, the Etihad court’s characterization of the Montreal Convention as one that favors passengers is at odds with
the history of the Convention. Further, the rule in Etihad frustrates both of the stated purposes of the Convention. First, it
directly undermines uniformity in the law. There can only be
uniformity in law if there is uniformity of interpretation—simply
having a single text is meaningless if the signatories’ courts do
not agree on what that text means. Second, it upsets the balance
of interests between passenger and carrier by creating a rule
that is explicitly pro-passenger, which is unsupported by the text
of the Convention and its history.
Notably, the drafters of the Montreal Convention left the text
of Article 17 largely unchanged from its Warsaw Convention
predecessor, evidencing their intent to retain the Warsaw Convention jurisprudence on this issue.43 It is well established that,
where the drafters of the Montreal Convention did not intend
to change a given provision from the Warsaw Convention, the
Warsaw Convention jurisprudence should be given decisive
See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985).
Etihad, 870 F.3d at 423.
39 See generally Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], International Conference on Air
Law, Montreal, 10–28 May 1999: Minutes, ICAO Doc. 9775-001 (2001).
40 Id. at 46–47, paras. 6, 12.
41 Id. at 46, para. 5.
42 Id. at 51, para. 29.
43 Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, with Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air art. 17,
Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
37
38
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weight.44 The Sixth Circuit noted this but painstakingly undertook to find a way to avoid this rule.45 The Warsaw Convention’s
analogue to Article 17 reads as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.46

The Montreal Convention’s counterpart is nearly identical:
“The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking.”47
The differences are minimal and largely reflect stylistic
changes that evolved in the language over the span of seventy
years.48 The only relevant change is the substitution of the Warsaw Convention’s “in event of” language for the Montreal Convention’s “in case of.”49 The difference is not persuasive. Should
one take the textual analysis used by the Etihad court to interpret the phrase “in case of” and apply it to “in event of,” the
result would be unchanged.50 Because the Sixth Circuit could
point to no other portion of Article 17 that reflected the drafters’ intent to displace the Warsaw Convention, the court’s decision proceeds from a logically perilous beginning.51 Further, to
argue for a new interpretation, the Etihad court noted that the
dictionary definition of “in case of” is “in the event of”; however,
“in the event of” is the exact language (disregarding the article
“the”) that the Warsaw Convention used.52 If anything, this provides further proof that the drafters did not intend to change
the interpretation of Article 17. There is flatly no indication
whatsoever that the drafters intended such displacement, and as
44 See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 501 F. Supp. 2d 902, 907–08 (E.D.
Ky. 2007).
45 Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 411–14 (6th Cir. 2017).
46 Warsaw Convention, supra note 43, art. 17.
47 Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 17.
48 Compare Warsaw Convention, supra note 43, art. 17, with Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 17.
49 Etihad, 870 F.3d at 413–14.
50 See id. at 412–15.
51 Id. at 414–15.
52 Id. at 413; Warsaw Convention, supra note 43, art. 17.
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such, the traditional interpretation should have been given controlling weight.
Further, the Sixth Circuit impermissibly violated the presumption in favor of uniformity. The presumption in favor of uniformity is the fundamental principle that courts should not
create a circuit split without a compelling reason to do so.53 On
the facts of Etihad, the Sixth Circuit plainly did not need to create a circuit split to reach a just result for the simple reason that
applying the traditional interpretation of Article 17 would have
allowed Doe to recover. As has now been repeated ad nauseam,
the traditional interpretation requires that the mental anguish
“flow from” the physical injury.54 It cannot fairly be argued that
Doe’s mental anguish (fear of contagious disease) did not “flow
from” the physical injury she sustained (pricking her finger on
the loose hypodermic needle). The court characterized the
mental injury as resulting from the accident—the contact with
the needle.55 However, this characterization is inaccurate. If the
contact with the needle (the accident) had occurred without the
physical injury (the needle breaking Doe’s skin), Doe would
have no rational fear of contagion. Because the result would
have been the same regardless of whether the Sixth Circuit applied the traditional interpretation or its new rule, the presumption in favor of uniformity weighs in favor of applying the
traditional rule.
Given that the result does not change by applying the Etihad
interpretation or the traditional interpretation, it seems likely
that the Sixth Circuit here was taking Etihad as an opportunity to
rewrite a test that, in its view, is unfair. Accepting arguendo,
however, that the effects of applying the traditional interpretation are undesirable, the courts are not the proper venue to effectuate change. Should the nations party to the Montreal
Convention wish to change the standard for recovering damages
for mental anguish, they may do so by reconvening and establishing a new convention or an amendment to the existing one.
Following this method, the uniformity of interpretation is preserved, and the interests of the various nations are respected.
When courts take this task upon themselves, however, neither of
these important concerns are given their due weight.
53 See, e.g., Wagner v. PennWest Farm Credit, 109 F.3d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1997)
(stating that courts “require a compelling basis to . . . effect[ ] a circuit split”).
54 Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 375 (2d Cir. 2004).
55 Etihad, 870 F.3d at 434.
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The issue of gravest concern is the court’s apparent disregard
for the interpretations of the United States’ co-signatories to the
Convention. It is a well-established principle that when interpreting treaties, courts should give substantial weight to the interpretations of other nations party to the treaty.56 In fact, to
interpret Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, the courts of
multiple other nations that are party to the Montreal Convention have looked to the holding in Ehrlich and applied the traditional interpretation.57 This is a well-established principle of
treaty interpretation; as Justice Scalia once said, foreign interpretations serve as evidence of the shared intentions of the nations in establishing the treaty.58 However, the Sixth Circuit
uncritically dismissed the opinions of these co-signatory nations.59 This has the effect not only of defeating the intent of the
various states that entered the treaty, but also of disrupting the
uniformity of the law.
The implications of this decision are significant.60 Uniformity
of law is only possible where there is uniformity of interpretation
of the law. A common text does nothing to bring about uniformity if the various courts do not agree on its meaning. When the
interpretation of the Convention becomes fractured, the Convention fails to provide the clarity and predictability that air carriers need to be able to conform their behavior to the law.
Uniformity is an issue of particular concern to international air
carriers.61 Today, large air carriers may fly to several nations all
over the world on any given day. For multinational air carriers,
sufficiently fractured interpretations could force them to conform to tens, if not hundreds, of different laws; the purpose of
the Convention is to allow them to conform their behavior to
only one. Further, the Etihad interpretation runs the risk of uneAir France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985).
See generally Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd v Casey, [2017] NSWCA 32 (Austl.).
58 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660–61 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
59 Etihad, 870 F.3d at 432–33.
60 In addition to its significance for the reasons stated above, Etihad also represents a sweeping expansion of tort liability for air carriers. This aspect of the case
has been discussed at length elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this note. For a
considered discussion of Etihad’s expansion of liability, see David M. Krueger,
Mental Distress for Airline Lawyers: The Sixth Circuit’s Decision in Doe v. Etihad, 31
No. 2 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (2018).
61 Brief of Amicus Curiae International Air Transport Association in Support
of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–24, Doe v. Etihad Airways P.S.J.C., 870 F.3d
406 (6th. Cir. 2017) (No. 17-977).
56
57
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qual treatment of passengers and violates the basic principle
that like cases should be treated alike.62 As the law stands today,
two passengers with factually identical accidents would not receive the same treatment under Article 17 if one happened to
land in Michigan and the other in New York.
The Supreme Court should take its earliest opportunity to
clarify the law on this important issue. Because the Sixth Circuit
disregarded the presumption in favor of uniformity, the interpretations of co-signatory nations, and the history of the Montreal Convention, the Etihad interpretation should be overruled.
Doubtlessly, there are times when the facts of an individual case
and the interests of justice will require that these principles of
interpretive methodology be discarded. The obvious critique of
the traditional interpretation is that the results it can reach are
unjust. If there is a proper time to rewrite the rule, however, this
case is not it because the interests of justice are equally advanced
by either interpretation. The result here would be unchanged
whether the Sixth Circuit had chosen to apply the traditional—
and universally applied—interpretation of Article 17 or whether
it had created its new test. Further, even if the traditional interpretation is viewed as undesirable, the courts are an improper
venue for changing it. If the nations party to the treaty wish to
create a more pro-passenger rule, they may do so by reconvening and creating a new Convention. This is the proper venue in
which to reform the rule because it respects the intentions of
the nations becoming party to the Convention and preserves the
essence of the Convention, uniformity. Moreover, the drafters of
the Convention knew what the previous interpretation was, and
the history of the Convention shows clearly that they chose not
to change it. Allowing this new test to stand only serves to encourage forum shopping, discourage the similar treatment of
similar cases, and frustrate the ability of international air carriers to conform their behavior to the law.
When considering the interpretation of the Montreal Convention, the importance of uniformity, both among nations and
among the circuits, cannot be overstated. For these reasons, the
rule established in Etihad should be disregarded.
62 See, e.g., Rex v. Wilkes (1770) 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 335; 4 Burr 2527, 2542
(Eng.) (opinion of Lord Mansfield).

